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Abstract
This paper examines whether e¢ ciency considerations require that
optimal labour income taxation is progressive or regressive in a model
with skill heterogeneity, endogenous skill acquisition and a production
sector with capital-skill complementarity. We nd that wage inequal-
ity driven by the resource requirements of skill-creation implies pro-
gressive labour income taxation in the steady-state as well as along the
transition path from the exogenous to optimal policy steady-state. We
nd that these results are explained by a lower labour supply elasticity
for skilled versus unskilled labour which results from the introduction
of the skill acquisition technology.
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1 Introduction
The literature on optimal taxation has examined extensively the question
of the optimal progressivity of the tax system in environments with hetero-
geneous agents and income inequality (see e.g. Mirrlees (1971), Diamond
(1998), Saez (2001) and Kocherlakota (2010)). This framework is mainly
chosen to capture the key trade-o¤ underpinning the choice of optimal pro-
gressive taxation, namely equity versus e¢ ciency. On one hand, equity ambi-
tions typically prescribe progressivity of the tax system, while, on the other
hand, e¢ ciency goals are generally associated with regressive tax structures.
The literature has also found that in some circumstances progressive taxa-
tion may improve resource allocation by correcting for an underlying market
failure. For instance, when lower income is related to market exclusion, redis-
tributive taxation may increase economic growth by increasing participation
and economic performance (see e.g. Drazen (2000)).
In contrast to the studies referred to above, this paper examines whether
optimal labour income taxation is progressive or regressive in a representa-
tive agent setup without market failures, incorporating skill heterogeneity,
capital-skill complementarity, endogenous skill acquisition and wage inequal-
ity. Our interest in this question is motivated by the empirical relevance
of both wage inequality and the proposed model structure. For example,
following reductions in earnings inequality in the U.S. for most of the 20th
century, this trend has reversed since 1980 such that the wage premium for
skilled workers is at its highest level since 1910 (see e.g. Goldin and Katz
(2008)).1 Additionally, Goldin and Katz (2008) provide historical evidence
for the 20th century demonstrating that wage inequality has developed within
a production sector characterised by capital-skill complementarity.
As discussed above, optimal progressive taxation generally follows from
equity considerations and may lead to increased e¢ ciency in the presence of
market failures. However, while we generally expect some form of regressive
taxation for e¢ ciency reasons, we conjecture that the implications of income
taxation for resource allocation ultimately depend on the structure of the
underlying economy. Thus, in the context of the empirically relevant analyt-
ical framework sketched out above, this paper concentrates on the e¢ ciency
incentives of optimal taxation by employing perfect capital and labour mar-
kets to derive the Ramsey plan that minimises tax distortions. As is common
in the public nance literature of Ramsey optimal taxation, the requirement
to tax will be exogenously imposed on the government, which is assumed to
1Given the importance of these developments, an extensive literature has studied wage
di¤erentials between college and high school graduates (see e.g. Acemoglu and Autor
(2011) Goldin and Katz (2008) and Hornstein et al. (2005) for reviews).
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have access to a commitment technology. Additionally, since we do not allow
policy makers to have access to lump-sum policy instruments, we focus on
the second-best Ramsey problem.
In light of the above, we calculate optimal factor income taxation in an
environment embodying two types of labour services (skilled and unskilled),
two types of capital (structures and equipment) and endogenous acquisition
of skill. We employ the production technology in Krusell et al. (2000) and
also used in e.g. Lindquist (2004), He and Liu (2008) and Pourpourides
(2011), since this has been shown to provide a good match to the data. This
technology species that equipment capital complements skilled labour more
than unskilled so that changes in its accumulation are skill biased.
Our analysis of skill acquisition and capital-skill complementarity builds
on and extends the model in He and Liu (2008).2 In particular, we assume
that a representative household decides how to allocate its expenditure into
investment in the two types of capital stock and into goods for creating
skilled labour. Moreover, it decides how to allocate its time endowment
into leisure, labour supply in skill and unskilled jobs, and in education or
training for creating skilled labour. The technology assumed for the creation
of skilled hours follows a standard Cobb-Douglas form, which allows the
model to capture the goods and time opportunity costs of creating skilled
labour services. The resource requirements associated with skill acquisition
in turn imply that there is a wage premium accruing to skilled labour to
compensate for these costs.
In other recent work, Angelopoulos et al. (2014), we analyse optimal tax
smoothing under skill heterogeneity and capital-skill complementarity, when
the government has access to state-contingent debt and a complete set of
state-contingent tax instruments. This is carried out in a stochastic envi-
ronment with endogenous and exogenous skill supply by di¤erent workers.
In contrast, our interest here is in optimal factor return taxation in a de-
terministic environment with a representative worker, both in the long-run
as well along the transition to the Ramsey steady-state. In particular, by
rst focusing on the long-run under Ramsey policy, we examine the degree
of optimal labour income tax progressivity. Second, by calibrating the model
under exogenous policy to data averages for the U.S., we calculate the op-
timal transition paths for policy and allocations from the exogenous policy
economy to the Ramsey steady-state.
In contrast to general expectations, when only resource allocation motives
2The model in He and Liu (2008) provides a useful framework in which they study
policy reforms in the presence of wage inequality. Since our aim here is to analyse optimal
policy, we modify their model to allow for an endogenous labour-leisure choice, which is
necessary when examining optimal labour taxes.
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maintain, we nd that wage inequality driven by the resource requirements of
skill-creation implies progressive labour income taxation. We nd that this
is explained by the lower labour supply elasticity for skilled labour relative
to that of unskilled. The intuition for this result is that the resource implica-
tions for creating skilled labour generates additional opportunity costs for the
provision of labour hours, which act to reduce the responsiveness of skilled
labour supply when the tax on skilled labour income changes. When the
model is calibrated to U.S. data, these e¤ects, on balance, lower the skilled
labour supply elasticity relative to that for the unskilled. Thus they create
an incentive for the Ramsey planner to tax skilled labour income more than
unskilled for e¢ ciency purposes. Interestingly, the optimal progressivity of
the labour income tax in the model is comparable with existing levels of
income tax progressivity.
We next nd that the Ramsey plan requires capital taxes to be set very
high in the rst period and then rapidly decrease towards zero, as is common
in the literature on optimal capital taxation (see e.g. Chamley (1986) and
Chari and Kehoe (1999)). By contrast, both labour income taxes turn into
subsidies in the rst period, before converging to their steady-state levels.
Notably, the tax system becomes progressive from the rst period. As is
also common in the optimal taxation literature, the government runs big
surpluses in the rst period, which allows it to create a stock of assets, which
is in turn used to nance primary decits in the future. Finally, it is worth
noting the Ramsey plan implies a sharp increase in wage inequality in the
rst periods, before the skill premium returns e¤ectively to its initial level.
However, the increase in tax progressivity implies that net wage inequality
is reduced under Ramsey policy.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the
theoretical model. Section 3 rst species the functional forms used for
production, utility and skill acquisition, followed by the model calibration
and the steady-state solution under exogenous scal policy. Section 4 solves
the Ramsey model and discusses the steady-state results for optimal policy
together with the transition paths of the optimal policy instruments and
allocations. Finally, section 5 contains the conclusions.
2 The model
The economy is populated by a representative household which supplies
skilled and unskilled labour services. Following He and Liu (2008) skilled
labour supply requires the creation of skill, which is determined by time and
goods. There is also a representative rm that uses two types of capital and
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two types of labour for the production of a homogeneous product. Following
Krusell et al. (2000), skilled labour is assumed to be more complementary to
capital equipment than unskilled labour. Thus, capital equipment accumu-
lation is skill biased and tends to increase the skill premium, dened as the
ratio of the skilled to unskilled wage. In contrast, increases in the relative
supply of skilled labour tend to reduce the skill premium. Since provision of
skilled labour comes at a cost to the household, a wage premium for skilled
labour is required in equilibrium to maintain net wage parity. Finally, the
government nances exogenous public spending by issuing debt, taxing all
sources of income and subsidising investment in skill acquisition.
2.1 The representative household
2.1.1 Utility
The lifetime utility of the representative household is given by:
U =
1X
t=0
tu(Ct; lt) (1)
where 0 <  < 1 is a constant discount factor and denotes the time preference
of the individual; Ct and lt are consumption and leisure respectively at period
t; and u() is increasing in its arguments, strictly concave and three times
continuously di¤erentiable.
2.1.2 Constraints
The representative household faces the following time constraint:
1 = lt + h
s
t + h
u
t + et (2)
where hst and h
u
t denote skilled and unskilled labour work time respectively
in period t and et is time devoted to education or other training for skills
acquisition in period t.
The skill acquisition function is given by:
hst = g(E
g
t ; et) (3)
where Egt is expenditure on creating skills, and g(:) is increasing in its argu-
ments, strictly concave and three times continuously di¤erentiable.
The law of motion for the two types of capital stock , i = p; e, where p
and e denote plant and equipment capital respectively, is given by:
Kit+1 = (1  i)Kit + I it . (4)
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The depreciation rate is denoted 0  i  1 and Ii;t is the investment in
period t.
Finally, the household has the following budget constraint equating total
expenditure with total income in period t:
Ct + I
p
t + I
e
t + (1  sgt )Egt + bt+1Rbt = (1  
s
t )w
s
th
s
t+
+(1  ut )wut hut + (1   pt )rptKpt + (1   et )retKet + bt
(5)
where, bt+1
Rbt
is the discounted value of bonds bought by the household at start
of period t; Rbt 
 
1 + rbt

is the gross return to bonds; bt is the payout value
of bonds bought at period t   1; sgt is a subsidy for spending on goods for
skill acquisition;  st ; 
u
t ; 
p
t and 
e
t are the tax rates on skilled and unskilled
labour income as well as plant and equipment capital income in period t
respectively.
2.1.3 First-order conditions
Using equation (4) for i = p; e to substitute out plant and equipment invest-
ment, the Lagrangian for the household problem is:
L = max
1X
j=0
ju(Ct+j; lt+j) + t+jfCt+j +Kpt+j+1  (6)
  (1  p)Kpt+j +Ket+j+1   (1  e)Ket+j + (1  sgt )Egt+
+
bt+j+1
Rbt+j
  (1   st+j)wst+jhst+j   (1  ut+j)wut+ijhut+j 
  (1   pt+j)rpt+jKpt+j   [(1   et+j)ret+j]Ket+j   bt+jg+
+Mt+j[h
s
t   g(Egt+j; et+j)]
where from the time constraint, lt+j = 1  hst+j   hut+j   et+j: The represen-
tative household chooses fCt; hst ; hut ; et; Egt ; Kpt+1; Ket+1; bt+1g1t=0 given prices
and taxes to maximize equation (6) which gives respectively the following
rst-order conditions (FOCs):
UCt =  t (7)
Uhst = t(1   st )wst  Mt (8)
Uhut = t(1  ut )wut (9)
Uet =Mtget (10)
gEgt =
t
Mt
(1  sgt ) (11)
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t = 

t+1

rpt+1(1   pt+1) + (1  p)
	
(12)
t = 

t+1

(ret+1(1   et+1) + (1  e)
	
(13)
t = t+1R
b
t (14)
where Ux and gx are the derivatives of the utility and skill accumulation
functions with respect to the variable x; and t and Mt are the Langrange
multipliers associated with the budget constraint and the skill acquisition
equation respectively.
These equilibrium conditions imply rst, that the marginal utility of con-
sumption, UCt, is equal to shadow price of the budget constraint, t which
measures the change in utility, when the constraint is relaxed by a unit.
Second, the marginal disutility of skilled/unskilled work time, Uhst and Uhut ,
are equal to the net of tax return to skilled/unskilled work, (1    st )wst and
(1   u)wut respectively valued by the shadow price, t. Additionally, the
return to skilled work is also net of the shadow price, Mt, of the skilled
employment constraint. Third, the marginal disutility of education, Uet, is
equal to the marginal increase in skilled employment due to a unit increase
in education time, get, valued by the shadow price, Mt. Fourth, the marginal
increase in skilled employment for a unit increase in goods expenditure, gEgt ,
is equal to the ratio of shadow prices, t
Mt
, net of the subsidy to goods invested
to create skill, (1  sgt ). Finally the last three conditions, equate the mar-
ginal utility of consumption in period t, t, with discounted marginal utility
of consumption in period t+1, t+1, which includes the consumption due to
saving in plant/equipment capital net of taxes and depreciation, and bonds.
By combining (8) with (9), and noting that Uhst = Uhut , we see that the
return to skilled labour net of tax and the cost for skill acquisition, must
equal in equilibrium, the net of tax return to unskilled labour:
(1   st )wst  
Mt
t
= (1  ut )wut . (15)
In other words, wage parity requires that the net returns to an hour in either
skilled or unskilled labour are equalised. Therefore, in an economy without
market failures, the skill premium is the compensation to skilled labour for
the opportunity cost of acquiring skills.
We next substitute the condition relating to the return to bonds (14) into
(12) and (13) to obtain:
Rbt = r
p
t+1(1   pt+1) + (1  p) (16)
Rbt = r
e
t+1(1   et+1) + (1  e). (17)
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These dene the no-arbitrage conditions for capital and bonds ensuring that
the three assets have the same rate of return in equilibrium. Finally, the
following transversality conditions for i = p; e must hold for the economy to
reach a stationary equilibrium:
lim
t!1
tUCt
bt+1
Rbt
= 0 (18)
lim
t!1
tUCtK
i
t+1 = 0. (19)
2.2 The representative rm
The representative rm produces a homogeneous consumption good, Yt, using
skilled, ehst , and unskilled, ehut , labour as well as plant, eKpt , and equipment,eKet , capital. Acting in perfectly competitive factor markets, taking prices,
policy and exogenous variables as given, the rm maximises its prots, t:
max tehst ;ehut ; eKpt ; eKet = Yt   w
s
t
ehst   wut ehut   rpt eKpt   ret eKet (20)
subject to a Krusell et al. (2000) type production function:
Yt = f
ehst ;ehut ; eKpt ; eKet  (21)
where f() is homogenous of degree one; a ~ over a variable denotes rm
quantities; wst and w
u
t are the returns to skilled and unskilled labour respec-
tively; and ret and r
p
t are the returns to capital holdings in equipment and
structures respectively.
Choosing the optimal amount of hours of skilled and unskilled labour to
hire and the optimal quantity of plant and equipment capital to rent yields
the following rst-order conditions:
wst   fehst = 0 (22)
wut   fehut = 0 (23)
rpt   f eKpt = 0 (24)
ret   f eKet = 0 (25)
equating the returns to each factor to their respective marginal products.
Given the structure employed, prots are zero in equilibrium.
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2.3 Government budget constraint
The governments budget constraint in each period is:
Gc + sgtE
g
t + bt = 
s
t w
s
th
s
t + 
u
t w
u
t h
u
t + 
p
t r
p
tK
p
t + 
e
t r
e
tK
e
t +
bt+1
Rbt
(26)
and states that expenditure on public consumption, Gc, the subsidy to spend-
ing on education and repayments on existing debt (issued at the start of
period t   1) must be equal to the revenues from taxing labour and capital
income plus the discounted value of new debt issued at the start of period t.
2.4 Market clearing conditions
Output can be used for public and private consumption, plant and equipment
investment as well as goods spending to acquire skills, implying the following
aggregate resource constraint:
Yt = G
c + Ct + I
p
t + I
e
t + E
g
t : (27)
Additionally, the market clearing conditions in the capital and labour mar-
kets are given by: eKpt = Kpt (28)eKet = Ket (29)ehst = hst (30)ehut = hut : (31)
2.5 Decentralised competitive equilibrium
The decentralised competitive equilibrium (DCE) with exogenous policy is
summarized by a sequence of allocations fCt; hst ; hut ; et; Egt ; Kpt+1; Ket+1;ehst ;ehut ;eKpt ; eKet g1t=0, one residual policy instrument fbt+1g1t=0 and prices fwst ; wut ; rpt ;
retg1t=0 such that the representative household solves its optimisation problem
and the rm maximizes prots, taking prices, tax rates, initial conditions for
capital and debt, and xed Gc as given; the government budget constraint is
satised and all markets clear. The DCE system is presented in the Appen-
dix, see equations (58)-(69).
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3 Quantitative analysis exogenous policy
In this section we rst specify the functional forms for production, utility
and skill acquisition. We then calibrate the exogenous policy model using
annual U.S. data for the period 1970-2011 and solve for the steady-state.
3.1 Functional forms
The production function follows the CES form as in Krusell et al. (2000):
Yt= A
 eKpt  f h Ae eKet  + (1  )ehsti'=+
+(1  )
ehut ' g 1 a' (32)
where,  1 < ';  < 1; 0 < a; ;  < 1: The parameters ' and  determine
the factor elasticities, i.e. 1=(1  ') is the elasticity of substitution between
equipment capital and unskilled labour and between skilled and unskilled
labour. The elasticity of substitution between equipment capital and skilled
labour is given by 1=(1 ).3 The parameters a; ;  denote the factor shares
and nally, A > 0 and Ae > 0 are the total factor productivity and capital
equipment augmenting technology parameters respectively.
The utility function follows the CRRA form in Chari et al. (1994):
u(Ct; lt) =
 
Ct l
1 
t
1 
1   (33)
where (; ) > 0 represent the preference parameters of the representative
household. Specically,  determines the weight given to consumption, and
 is the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient.
Finally, the skill acquisition equation is a variant of the form used in He
and Liu (2008):
hst = g(E
g
t ; et) = S
h
(Egt )
 (et)
1 
i
(34)
where the shares of goods and time in the creation of skills are given by 
and 1  respectively, with 0 <  < 1. The parameter S > 0 determines the
e¢ ciency of the skill-creation process. Finally, 0 <  < 1 is a measure of the
returns to scale and is positive but less than unity to ensure that the model
has a unique solution (see, e.g. He and Liu (2008)).
3Note that capital-skill complementarity maintains if 1=(1  ) < 1=(1  ').
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3.2 Calibration and steady-state
We calibrate the model under exogenous scal policy to target the key great-
ratios using U.S. annual data for the period 1970-2011. Table 2.1 below re-
ports the models quantitative parameters. Starting with the share of leisure
in utility, (1   ), we calibrate it to 0:65 so that, in the steady-state, the
household devotes about one third of its time to labour and education. The
relative risk aversion parameter,  = 2, is set to the value commonly em-
ployed in the literature.
The elasticities of substitution between skilled labour and capital and be-
tween unskilled labour and capital (or skilled labour) have been estimated
by Krusell et al. (2000). Following the literature (see e.g. Lindquist (2004),
and Pourpourides (2011)), we also use these estimates, to set ' = 0:401
and  =  0:495. Moreover, the income share of capital structures, a, is set
to 0.12, as in Lindquist (2004). The remaining parameters in the produc-
tion function are calibrated to ensure that the steady-state predictions of the
model in asset and labour markets are consistent with the data. More specif-
ically, the unskilled labour weight in composite input share, (1  ) = 0:3, is
calibrated to obtain a skilled to unskilled labour ratio of about 79% and the
capital equipment weight share in composite input,  = 0:47, is set to obtain
a skill premium of approximately 1:64.4 We also normalize the steady-state
values of TFP and capital equipment e¢ ciency to unity (i.e. A = Ae = 1).
The depreciation rates of capital structures and capital equipment, p =
0:08 and e = 0:1, are calibrated to obtain an annual capital to output ratio
of about 1:94, which is consistent with the annual data reported by the BEA
on capital stocks.5 These values are also in line with the works of Greenwood
et al. (1997) and Krusell et al. (2000). The time discount factor,  = 0:96,
is set to obtain a post-tax post-depreciation annual real rate of return on
capital of roughly 4:17%, which coheres with the value obtained in the data
from the World Bank.6
The returns to scale parameter, , in the skill acquisition equation is
calibrated to be equal to 0.425, to obtain an investment in education to
output ratio of about 1.8% which is similar to the average private expenditure
on education in the U.S.7 The weight on education time, 1  , is set equal
4The target value for the skill premium is obtained from U.S. Census data and the
skilled to unskilled labour data is from the Acemoglu and Autor (2011) dataset for the
past 20 years.
5Specically, the BEA Table 1.1 on xed-assets has been used to obtain the time series
for capital stock for 1970-2011.
6The data refers to the annual real interest rate from World Bank Indicators database
for the period 1970-2011 (i.e. FR.INR.RINR).
7Using annual data from U.S. National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Ed-
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to 0.45 to target average time in education as a share of total non-leisure
time of about 5%.8 The e¢ ciency of skills transformation, B, is normalised
to unity.9
Table 1: Calibration
Denitions Values
p depreciation rate of capital structures 0.080
e depreciation rate of capital equipment 0.100
 time discount factor 0.960
 weight attached to consumption in utility 0.350
 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion 2.000
 weight on goods investment. for skill acquisition 0.550
S e¢ ciency of skills production 1.000
 returns to scale in skill creation 0.424
 income share of capital structures 0.120
1
1  capital equipment to skilled labour elasticity 0.670
1
1 ' capital equipment to unskilled labour elasticity 1.670
 share of composite input to output 0.700
 share of capital equipment to composite input 0.470
 s skilled labour income tax rate 0.250
u unskilled labour income tax rate 0.200
 p tax rate on capital structures income 0.310
 e tax rate on capital equipment income 0.310
sg subsidy for goods investment in skill acquisition 0.000
A total factor productivity 1.000
Ae capital equipment productivity 1.000
Finally, we use the data from the ECFIN to construct series on e¤ective
capital and labour tax rates, following Martinez-Mongay (2000), to obtain
an average tax rate for capital and labour.10 Therefore, we set the tax rate
for both capital income  p =  e = 0:31 and the two labour income tax rates
ucation Statistics, for the period 1970-2011, the relevant share to output is about 2%.
8To obtain this value we assume that the total time spent in higher education is on
average 4 years. Note that the average years of working is 35. Therefore, the percentage
of time spent in education is 435 = 0:1143. Taking into account that on average, 40-45% of
the overall population in the U.S. are college educated (see Table 4 of the Census Bureau,
Survey of Income and Program Participation), we obtain: 435  0:45 = 0:0514.
9These parameters are within the range suggested in the related literature (i.e. Heck-
man (1976) and Stokey (1996)).
10In particular, we use data for 1970-2011, to construct the LITR and KITN rates for
e¤ective average labour and capital taxes respectively (see Martinez-Mongay (2000)), as
they treat self-employed income as capital income.
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u = 0:20 and  s = 0:25.11 Given that it is di¢ cult to obtain data for the
education investment subsidy, sg, we set it to zero under the exogenous scal
policy. We nally set the value of government expenditures, Gc = 0:0320, to
obtain a steady-state debt to output ratio, b=Y = 53%, which is equal to the
average debt to GDP ratio obtained in the data.12
Under exogenous scal policy we solve the decentralized competitive equi-
librium system of equations (58)-(69) in Appendix keeping the tax rates at
their calibrated values in Table 1. Table 2 presents the steady-state results
of the exogenous scal policy model together with the U.S. data averages for
1970-2011.
Table 2: Steady-state
model data
C=Y 0.563 0.660
K=Y 1.945 1.895
I=Y 0.181 0.146
Ig=Y 0.018 0.021
b=Y 0.530 0.530
hs=hu 0.798 0.763
Gc=Y 0.238 0.203
ws=wu 1.640 1.640
ws=wu 1.538 1.538
r 0.042 0.042
e
hs+hu+e
0.053 0.051
The steady-state presented in Table 2 conrms that the model is close to
the data as described above.13
4 Optimal scal policy
In this section we derive the optimal Ramsey plan, where it is assumed that
the government chooses the series of taxes, subsidies and debt to nance ex-
ogenously determined public spending, with the objective to maximise the
11Note that the calculation of the e¤ective labour income tax rate is equal to 0.22.
But since we assume that the skilled and unskilled labour income is taxed di¤erently
we decompose the labour income tax into skilled and unskilled tax so that the weighted
average of the two tax rates equals 0.22.
12The source of this time series is FRED Economic Data on Gross Federal Debt as a
percentage of GDP, 1970-2011.
13Note that the barred values in Table 2 are dened as follows: ws = (1   s)ws,
wu = (1  u)wu and r =  1   i ri +  1  i = Rb; where i = s; u.
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welfare of the household.14 The government, in other words, wishes to min-
imise the welfare costs of taxation. To obtain the second-best allocations,
it is assumed that the government has access to a commitment technology.
To solve the Ramsey problem we use the primal approach and rst derive
the present discounted value (PDV) of the households lifetime budget con-
straint making use of the no-arbitrage and transversality conditions for the
three assets as well as the Arrow-Debreu price of the bond. Second, we de-
rive the implementability constraint by substituting out prices and tax rates
from the households PDV budget constraint using the households and rms
rst-order conditions. Finally, we derive the optimal Ramsey plan by max-
imising the planners objective function subject to the implementability, skill
acquisition and aggregate resource constraint.
4.1 Implementability constraint
Summing the households budget constraint (5) successively forward from
t = 0 to t = 1 and imposing the no-arbitrage (16)-(17) and transversality
conditions (18)-(19) gives the households PDV or lifetime budget constraint:
1P
t=0

t 1Q
i=0
 
Rbi
 1
[Ct + (1  sgt )Egt ] =
1P
t=0

t 1Q
i=0
 
Rbi
 1
f(1   st )wsthst + (1  ut )wut hut g+ b0 + f(1   p0 )rp0+
+(1  p)gKp0 + f(1   e0 )re0 + (1  e)gKe0 :
(35)
Following Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012), the Arrow-Debreu price is de-
ned as: q0t =
t 1Q
i=0
 
Rbi
 1
, 8t  1, with q00 = 1, which implies that (35) can
be rewritten as:
1P
t=0
q0t [Ct + (1  sgt )Egt ] =
1P
t=0
q0t f(1   st )wsthst + (1  ut )wut hut g+
+b0 + f(1   p0 )rp0 + (1  p)gKp0 + f(1   e0 )re0 + (1  e)gKe0 .
(36)
Notice that the Arrow-Debreu price satises the recursion:
q0t+1 =
 
Rbt
 1
q0t . (37)
14Note that following the optimal scal policy literature, we keep the level of Gc xed
over time to the value obtained under exogenous scal policy. Note also that the subsidy
to skill creation expenditure is added to ensure that all margins relating to the households
decision making are taxed/subsidised, so that the optimal policy problem is indeed second-
best.
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Using the rst-order conditions (7) and (14), the above recursion can be
written as:
q0t+1 = 
t+1UCt+1
UC0
) q0t = t
UCt
UC0
. (38)
Substituting: (i) (38) into (36) for q0t ; (ii) the rst-order conditions of the
rm, (24)-(25) into (36) for rp0 and r
e
0 respectively; and (iii) the rst-order
conditions of the household, (7)(11) into (36) for (1   st )wst , (1   ut )wut
and (1  sgt ) gives the households implementability constraint:
1X
t=0
t

UCtCt  

Uet
get
gEgt

Egt +

Uhst +
Uet
get

hst + Uhut h
u
t

= A0 (39)
where, A0= UC0fb0+

(1   p0 )fKp0 + 1  p

Kp0+

(1   e0 )fKe0 + 1  e

Ke0 .
Note that fKp0 and fKe0 are obtained by substituting the market clearing
conditions (28)-(29) into f eKpt and f eKet respectively.
4.2 The primal approach
Under the primal approach the government maximises the following objective
function:
max
1X
t=0
tU (Ct; lt) (40)
subject to the aggregate resource constraint (27), the skill acquisition equa-
tion (3) and the implementability constraint (39) by choosing: fCt; hst ; hut ; et;
Egt ; K
p
t+1; K
e
t+1g1t=0 given f p0 ;  e0 ; b0; Kp0 ; Ke0g.15 Following Ljungqvist and Sar-
gent (2012) we dene a pseudo-value function and assume that  is the La-
grange multiplier with respect to the implementability constraint:
V (Ct; hs;t; hu;t; et; ) = U (Ct; lt) + fUCtCt 
 

Uet
get
gEgt

Egt +

Uhst +
Uet
get

hst + Uhut h
u
t g: (41)
We can then write the Lagrangian under the primal approach as:
J =
1X
t=0
tV (Ct; hs;t; hu;t; et; ) + t[Yt  Gct   Ct   Egt  Kpt+1+ (42)
+ (1  p)Kpt  Ket+1 + (1  e)Ket ] + t [hst   g(Egt ; et)]  A0
15Following the literature, we do not examine the problem of initial capital taxation and
thus not allow the government to optimally choose the capital income taxes at t = 0.
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where Yt is given by equation (32) above and t; t  0 8t, are sequences
of Lagrange multipliers with respect to the aggregate resource constraint
and the skill acquisition constraint respectively. Given the initial values of
capital taxes, debt and the two stocks of capital, equation J is maximised
with respect to fCt; hst ; hut ; et; Egt ; Kpt+1; Ket+1g1t=1 and for t = 0 equation J is
maximised with respect to fC0; hs0; hu0 ; e0; Ig0g yielding the following rst-order
conditions respectively:
VCt = t; t  1 (43)
Vhst =  tYhst   t; t  1 (44)
Vhut =  tYhut ; t  1 (45)
Vet = tget ; t  1 (46)
VEgt = t + tgE
g
t
; t  0 (47)
t = t+1
h
YKpt+1 + 1  p
i
; t  0 (48)
t = t+1
h
YKet+1 + 1  e
i
; t  0 (49)
VC0 = 0 + AC (50)
Vhs0 =  0Yhs0   0 + Ahs (51)
Vhu0 =  0Yhu0 + Ahu (52)
Ve0 = 0ge0 + Ae (53)
where Yx;t is the derivative of Yt, given by equation (32), with respect to
variable x at time t.
The above system of rst-order conditions implies that the system to be
solved will be di¤erent for t = 0 and t = 1; 2; 3:::T   1 and t = T . This
is reected in equations (70)-(93) reported in the Appendix. To solve this
system, we initially guess a value for  and solve equations (70)-(93) for an al-
location fCt; hst ; hut ; et; Egt ; t; Kpt+1; Ket+1g1t=0.16 The system has [(8 T ) + 1]
equations and is solved using standard non-linear numerical methods (see,
e.g. Garcia-Milà et al. (2010) and Adjemian et al. (2011)). Then we test if
the implementability constraint (39) is binding and we increase or decrease
accordingly the value of  until the implementability constraint is satised.
We set the initial conditions for debt, the two stocks of capital and the two
capital income taxes equal to their exogenous steady-state, to calculate the
dynamic transition path from the exogenous to optimal scal policy steady-
state. To ensure that the variables converge to the optimal scal policy
16Note that the multiplier t has been substituted out of the system presented in the
Appendix.
15
steady-state, we set the value of T = 250. The results indicate that model
convergence is achieved after 150 periods.
4.3 Optimal allocations and policy
We rst analyse the steady-state under optimal policy and compare outcomes
with the current economy. We then evaluate the transition paths that the
policymaker would choose if, starting from the current economy, economic
policy was chosen optimally by working as described in the previous subsec-
tion.
4.3.1 Ramsey policy in the steady-state
In Table 3, we present the Ramsey optimal resource allocations and policy
choices in the steady-state. The Table also includes the steady-state out-
comes of the economy under exogenous policy that is calibrated to the data
averages as explained in the previous section. The rst result which can
be conrmed in Table 3 is that, consistent with the literature on optimal
taxation, capital taxes are zero in the long-run, for both capital stocks. In
contrast, labour income taxes, which apply to production factors that are
bounded by the time constraint, are positive and, in fact, signicantly more
progressive compared with the calibrated economy under exogenous policy.
The tax revenue generated by these taxes, in addition to the revenue from
the assets that the government holds optimally in the steady-state, nance
the exogenous stream of public spending as well as optimal subsidies to skill
acquisition expenditure.
Table 3: Exogenous and Ramsey steady-states
Exogenous Ramsey Exogenous Ramsey
policy policy policy policy
Y 0.134 0.169 ws=wu 1.538 1.456
C 0.076 0.090  p 0.310 0.000
Kp 0.091 0.167  e 0.310 0.000
Ke 0.170 0.289  s 0.250 0.318
hs 0.118 0.135 u 0.200 0.233
hu 0.148 0.133 sg 0.000 0.451
e 0.015 0.014 b=Y 0.530 -0.475
Eg 0.002 0.005 U -76.438 -75.010
ws=wu 1.640 1.638  - 5.243%
The optimal allocations in turn reect the changes in the policy instru-
ments compared with the calibrated economy under exogenous policy. In
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particular, capital accumulation increases, following the elimination of the
capital taxes. The rise in skill-biased capital stock tends to increase the skill
premium, which acts to raise the relative skill supply. The latter is further
supported by the subsidy to skill acquisition expenditure. As a result, the
relative skill supply increases, so that the skill premium under Ramsey policy
is e¤ectively the same as the skill premium under exogenous policy. However,
the increase in the progressivity of labour income taxation implies that wage
inequality, as captured by the skill premium net of taxes, is reduced. Overall,
optimal policy reduces the distortions associated with the tax system. This
is evident by the increase in output and consumption under Ramsey policy
and by the welfare gains, in terms of consumption, obtained by moving from
exogenous to optimal policy. In particular, the welfare gains measured by
the compensating consumption supplement,  , are roughly 5.2%.17
4.3.2 Optimal progressive labour income taxes
The most striking result regarding optimal policy in Table 3 is that the labour
income taxes should optimally be progressive. What makes this result no-
table is that it is obtained in an economy without market failures and without
redistribution incentives for the policymaker.18 To understand this nding,
we start by the main principle of Ramsey taxation, which suggests that, to
minimise e¢ ciency distortions, taxes should be higher for more inelastic tax
bases.19 Our nding that skilled labour income should be taxed more than
unskilled is consistent with this principle, since in the economy studied here,
we nd that skilled labour supply is more inelastic than unskilled labour
supply. To demonstrate this, in Figure 1 we plot the percent deviations for
hs and hu from their steady-state under exogenous policy in Table 3, after
a permanent 1% change in either  s (solid lines) or u (dashed lines). Sub-
plots (1,1) and (1,2) respectively show the elasticities of skilled and unskilled
labour supply and the elasticities of skilled and unskilled labour income with
17The welfare gains are obtained as the compensating consumption supplement that
would make the economy under exogenous policy as well o¤ as the economy under optimal
policy.
18Note that optimal labour income progressivity is not driven by the subsidy to expen-
diture on skill acquisition, although the latter does a¤ect its magnitude. In particular, if
we restrict the government from having access to this policy instrument,  s is still higher
than u, but the di¤erence is smaller.
19The importance of the elasticities for labour income tax progressivity has been high-
lighted in the recent optimal taxation literature (see e.g. Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001)).
These studies also demonstrate the importance of the shape of the income (or skills) dis-
tribution and of the social weights in the objective function of the planner in setups with
heterogeneous households.
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respect to the tax rates. As can be seen, skill labour supply and income are
more inelastic with respect to the relevant income tax rate, compared with
unskilled labour supply and labour income. Accordingly, the policymaker
nds it optimal to tax skilled labour income more than unskilled, so that
labour income taxation is progressive.
[Figure 1 here]
In this economy, the elasticity of skilled labour supply with respect to the
tax rate is a¤ected by channels that operate via skill acquisition, in addition
to usual substitution and income e¤ects. To illustrate the importance of
these channels and explain how they a¤ect the skilled labour supply elasticity,
relative to unskilled labour supply elasticity, we next further investigate the
factors that determine the elasticities in our setup.20
The elasticity of skill supply with respect to the tax rate on skilled labour
income is dened as s  dhst
dst
st
hst
. Using the households optimality conditions
and the functional forms for the utility function assumed above, we have:
hst = 1  hut   et  
h
(1  ) + (1 )
get
i
Ct
(1   st )wst
(54)
which implies that the total derivative dh
s
t
dst
is given by:
dhst
dst
=
@hst
@st
+
@hst
@Ct
dCt
dst
+
@hst
@wst
dwst
dst
+
@hst
@hut
dhut
dst
+
@hst
@Egt
dEgt
dst
+
@hst
@et
det
dst
(55)
The elasticity of unskilled labour supply with respect to the tax rate on
unskilled labour income is dened as u  dhut
dut
ut
hut
. Using the households op-
timality conditions and the functional forms for the utility function assumed
above, we have:
hut = 1  hst  
(1  )Ct
(1  ut )wut
(56)
which implies that the total derivative dh
u
t
dut
is given by:
dhut
dut
=
@hut
@ut
+
@hut
@Ct
dCt
dut
+
@hut
@wut
dwut
dut
+
@hut
@hst
dhst
dut
(57)
20If skill acquisition is determined by a dynamic accumulation process, so that skill
creation is given by hst+1 = hh
s
t + g(E
g
t ; et), h < 1, as in e.g. He and Liu (2008), optimal
tax progressivity is even higher. Intuitively, in this case, skill supply is even more di¢ cult
to adjust when taxes change, hence the Ramsey planner has an increased incentive to tax
skilled labour income. We do not show results from a such a modeling assumption here
to focus the discussion on a more convenient representation that captures the economic
channels introduced by skill acquisition. A full analysis of a dynamic social transition
function is beyond the scope of this paper (see e.g. Angelopoulos et al. (2013) for a model
with micro-founded mobility between skilled and unskilled sectors).
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Note that the two e¤ects from skill creation in (55), i.e. @h
s
t
@Egt
dEgt
dst
< 0
and @h
s
t
@et
det
dst
> 0, are absent from the total derivative expression for unskilled
labour supply in (57).21 The rst suggests that the reduction in Egt , due to
the fall in the net return to skilled labour, tends to decrease hst because of
the increase in disposable income. The second, says that the reduction in
et, due to the fall in the net return to skilled labour, tends to increase hst
since there is more time available to work. Since Figure 1 has shown that
jsj < juj, it appears that the positive e¤ect from et on dh
s
t
dst
dominates the
negative one from Egt .
4.3.3 Optimal transition paths
We can now examine the optimal transition of the economy from the steady-
state of exogenous policy, as summarised in Table 3, to the optimal steady-
state under Ramsey policy in the same Table. We plot the optimal transition
paths for the policy instruments and the economic allocations in Figure 2.
[Figure 2 here]
Consistent with the analysis of optimal capital income taxes (see e.g.
Chamley (1986) and Chari et al. (1994)), the capital taxes,  pt and 
e
t , are
set very high in the rst period, switch to zero in the second period and
remain at this level. This tax policy allows the government to generate high
tax revenue in the rst period, accumulate assets by lending to the household
and thus generate a stream of revenue from the returns to these assets in the
future (see path of bt=Yt). The pattern of the capital tax rates is reected
on the dynamics of the capital stocks, Kpt and K
e
t , which initially decrease
and then increase. In turn, these dynamics inuence the movements of the
wage rates, since the marginal products of labour are positive functions of
the capital stocks. However, given the skill-biased role of equipment capital,
the skill premium, wst=w
u
t , increases initially, before returning e¤ectively, in
the long-run, to its original steady-state.
The initial rise in capital taxes (and fall in capital stocks) is met by a
reduction in both labour income taxes,  st and 
u
t , (which become subsidies in
the rst period) and a subsidy to skill expenditure, sgt , which help to increase
labour supply, hst and h
u
t , despite the fall in marginal labour productivity.
This policy mediates the negative e¤ects on the economy in the very short-
run brought about by the capital tax and capital stock movements. Both
21Note the partial derivatives in these two e¤ects are signed using (54) and (56) re-
spectively; whereas the total derivatives are signed through the impulse responses to a
permanent 1% change in  st and 
u
t respectively.
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labour income taxes return to positive magnitudes after the rst period, but
it is interesting to note that the labour tax system is optimally progressive
from the rst period onwards. This progressivity in turn works to reduce
post-tax wage inequality, wst=w
u
t .
Note that the response of skilled labour hours to optimal policy is much
smoother than the response of unskilled labour hours, despite the higher
volatility in the skilled wage rate compared with that of the unskilled. This
is consistent with a more inelastic skilled labour supply, as discussed above.
Moreover, it is consistent with empirical evidence which suggests that in the
USA, over 1979-2002, the standard deviation of unskilled labour hours was
on average 1.3 times higher than the standard deviation of skilled labour
hours, despite the standard deviation of the skilled wage being 1.2 times
higher than the standard deviation of the unskilled wage.22
Optimal policy leads to a more e¢ cient economy with higher output,
Yt, (i.e. more goods production) and consumption, Ct. Hence, the implicit
relative cost of goods versus time in creating skill is lower for the Ramsey
planner, relative to the exogenous policy case. This, in turn, results in a
subsidy for skill acquisition expenditure, making it cheaper for the household
to use goods relative to time when creating skill, and this is reected in the
movements of education time, et, and skill expenditure, E
g
t , which decrease
and increase respectively
5 Conclusions
This paper examined whether e¢ ciency considerations required that optimal
labour income taxation was progressive or regressive under skill heterogene-
ity, endogenous skill acquisition and a production sector characterised by
capital-skill complementarity. We isolated optimal taxation from incentives
for income redistribution by working with a representative agent framework
and considered the problem of a Ramsey planner, who had access to a full
instrument set to minimise the distortions associated with taxation in an
economy with perfect capital and labour markets.
In this framework, the household decided how to allocate its expenditure
into investment in the two types of capital stock and into goods for creating
skilled labour. Moreover, it decided how to allocate its time endowment
into leisure, labour supply in skill and unskilled jobs, as well as in education
for creating skilled labour. The resource requirements associated with skill
22These statistics are obtained using the quarterly data on skilled and unskilled hours
and wages in Lindquist (2004). We thank Matthew Lindquist for making these series
available to us.
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acquisition in turn implied that there is a wage premium accruing to skilled
labour to compensate for these costs.
We found that wage inequality in this setup implied progressive labour
income taxation, because the labour supply elasticity for skilled labour was
lower relative to that of unskilled. The resource implications for creating
skilled labour established e¤ects on the skilled labour supply elasticity, driven
changes in the households disposable income and in its available total time
when the tax on skilled labour income changed. These additional e¤ects
worked to increase and decrease, respectively, the elasticity of skilled labour
supply with respect to the tax rate. When the model was calibrated to
U.S. data, the skilled labour supply elasticity was lower relative to that for
unskilled labour, thus leading to optimal progressive labour income taxes.
We further found that the Ramsey plan required that capital taxes were
set very high in the rst period and then rapidly decreased towards zero, as is
common in the literature on optimal capital taxation. Moreover, the govern-
ment ran big surpluses in the rst period, which allowed it to create a stock
of assets, which were in turn used to nance primary decits in the future.
The changes in taxation along the optimal path implied a sharp increase in
wage inequality in the rst periods, before the skill premium returned e¤ec-
tively to its initial level. However, since the tax system became progressive
from the rst period, net wage inequality is reduced under Ramsey policy
over the entire transition path.
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6 Appendix
6.1 DCE system of equations
The DCE, when the Lagrange multipliers t, and Mt have been substituted
can be written as follows:
 Uhst
UCt
  (1   st )wst  
Uet
UCtget
= 0 (58)
 Uhut
UCt
  (1  ut )wut = 0 (59)
  Uet
UC;t
  (1  sgt )
get
gEgt
= 0 (60)
UCt
UCt+1
  rpt+1(1   pt+1)  (1  p) = 0 (61)
UCt
UCt+1
  ret+1(1   et+1)  (1  e) = 0 (62)
UCt
UCt+1
 Rbt = 0 (63)
wst   fehst = 0 (64)
wut   fehut = 0 (65)
rpt   f eKt = 0 (66)
ret   f eKet = 0 (67)
Gct + s
g
tE
g
t + bt    st wsthst   ut wut hut    pt rptKpt    et retKet  
bt+1
Rbt
= 0 (68)
Yt  Gc   Ct   Ipt   Iet   Egt = 0. (69)
6.2 First order conditions of optimal policy
The rst order conditions for the governments problem are:
 for t = 0:
Vhs0 =  (VC0   AC)Yhs0   0 + Ahs (70)
Vhu0 =  (VC0   AC)Yhu0 + Ahu (71)
Ve0 = 0ge0 + Ae (72)
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VEg0 = 0gE
g
0
+ VC0   AC (73)
VC0   AC = VC1

YKp1 + 1  p

(74)
VC0   AC = VC1

YKe1 + 1  e

(75)
Y0 = G
c + C0 + I
p
0 + I
e
0 + E
g
0 (76)
hs0 = g(E
g
0 ; e0) (77)
 for t = 1; 2; 3:::T   1:
Vhst =  VCtYhst   t (78)
Vhut =  VCtYhut (79)
Vet = tget (80)
VEgt = tgE
g
t
+ VCt (81)
VCt = VCt+1
h
YKpt+1 + 1  p
i
(82)
VCt = VCt+1
h
YKet+1 + 1  e
i
(83)
Yt = G
c + Ct + I
p
t + I
e
t + E
g
t (84)
hst = g(E
g
t ; et) (85)
 for t = T :
VhsT =  VCTYhsT   T (86)
VhuT =  VCTYhuT (87)
VeT = TgeT (88)
VEgT = TgE
g
T
+ VCT (89)
1 = 
h
YKpT + 1  p
i
(90)
1 = 

YKeT + 1  e

(91)
YT = G
c + CT + I
p
T + I
e
T + E
g
T (92)
hsT = g(E
g
T ; eT ) (93)
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Figure 1: Impulse responses for labour supply and income
Solid lines are for 1% perm. shock to τs
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 and dashed lines are for 1% perm. shock to τu
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Figure 2: Transition paths from exogenous to optimal steady−state
